Introduction
Information of one firm could be extremely important for other firms in the same industry. For example, on September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brother announced its bankruptcy, the share price of Morgan Stanley dropped 13.54%; the share price of Goldman Sachs dropped 12.13%; and the share price of Citigroup dropped 15.14%.
Consistent with this idea, Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) show that when a firm announces earnings restatement in the industry, the three day abnormal return of other firms in this industry is -0.5% on average. The prior literature has also shown that market participants, such as investors, analysts and managers, incorporate information originating from firms in the same industry in their valuation (Foster, 1981 , Baginski, 1987 , their earnings forecasts (Ramnath, 2002) and their corporate investment decisions (Durnev and Mangen, 2008) .
However, the prior literature suggests that the price reaction to the news released by other firms is inefficient, even if the exact form of the inefficiency is still debated.
For example, previous studies have shown that investors react strongly to other firms' news contained in earnings announcement (Foster, 1981 , Han, Wild and Ramesh, 1989 , Han and Wild, 1990 , Freeman and Tse, 1992 . Yet, two studies suggest that markets are not unbiased in processing this information. Ramnath (2002) reports that neither analysts nor investors fully incorporate the news contained in earnings surprise of the first earnings announcer in the industry in their reaction to the other firms in the same industry and exhibit under-reaction to the news. Using a different industry classification, Thomas and Zhang (2008) claim that investors over-react to the news contained in earnings surprises of other firms in the same industry.
This study explores channels that improve the efficiency of information transfer and focuses on management forecasts. I consider the following setting. Suppose that two firms, A and B are in the same industry and they are covered by two analysts, X and Y. Analyst X covers both firm A and B while analyst Y only covers firm B (I refer to analyst X as MF analyst, and to analyst Y as non-MF analyst). Firm A issues a management forecast (I refer to this firm A as MF firm). Because of the information spillover effect, both analyst X (i.e., the MF analyst) and analyst Y will revise their forecasts of firm B (I refer to this firm B as non-MF firm) at this time.
Only analyst X has experience in forecasting MF firm A's earnings. The question is then whether this MF-experience helps analyst X to form more accurate earnings forecasts of firm B (non-MF firm) or not, and to the extent that it does, whether investors are more responsive to analyst X's forecast revision than to analyst Y's. If the answer to these questions is "Yes" in both cases, analysts play an important role in the efficiency of the information transfer among firms in the same industry.
In contrast to the prior literature, this study investigates the information spillover effect by using management forecasts instead of earnings announcements. Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) stress the importance of these forecasts and note that "they represent one of the key voluntary disclosure mechanisms by which managers establish or alter market earnings expectations, preempt litigation concerns, and influence their reputation for transparent and accurate reporting". It is perhaps then unsurprising that these forecasts also convey important information for other firms. For example , Baginski, (1987) has shown that investors in other firms of the same industry react strongly the news contained in these management forecasts.
Management forecasts offer three advantages over earnings announcements to empirically investigate information transfer between firms.
First, earnings announcements of firms in the same industry are usually clustered around the same day. This clustering makes it difficult to distinguish between the effects of different announcements. In contrast, firms, even those in the same industry, typically issue management forecasts on different dates. This creates a more powerful empirical setting to distinguish between the effect of analysts' MF-experience and other potential confounding factors. Second, earnings announcements are mandatory and audited. Although earnings are not free of biases, management forecasts are likely to be even more biased (Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman, 2008) . This creates a greater difficulty for the analysts to process the information in the forecasts and should increase the relevance of the experience in covering other firms in the same industry. Analysts with more MF-experience should have greater advantage when interpreting management forecasts than analysts with less MF-experience. Finally, management forecasts have different levels of precision. For example, the literature (Baginski and Hassell, 1997) indicates that the information contained in point management forecasts is more precise than that contained in range management forecasts. The setting of management forecasts allows the examination of the impact of the precision of the information on the efficiency of intra-industry information transfer.
important relevant information (such as the information contained in other firms earnings forecasts) to improve their forecasts accuracy.
I also expect that MF analysts are more apt at transferring information between firms than non-MF analysts are. This study makes at least two contributions. First, the prior literature provides little guidance regarding the mechanisms that facilitate the intra-industry information transfer. This study is the first to examine the role analysts play in the intra-industry information transfer process. As evidenced by the literature reviewed earlier in this introduction, the transfer of information has important economic consequences. This study provides evidence that information intermediaries, financial analysts in particular, are active and effective in transferring information within the industry.
This study also shows that one important determinant-analysts' experience-could affect the efficiency of information transfer within the industry and the ability of analysts in interpreting public information.
Second, this study adds to our knowledge of the determinants of analysts' forecasting accuracy and portfolio selection. The results presented in this study suggest that the experience of other firms increase analysts' forecasting accuracy when there is information transfer within the industry. These results also offer a potential explanation to the findings in Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Graham (2005) . Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that analysts are more likely to cover firms with high disclosure quality. Graham (2005) finds that firms issuing management forecasts are followed by more analysts. My results suggest the existence of benefits for analysts following firms with high disclosure quality or issuing management forecasts aside from the ease to forecast the firm that disclose the information. Analysts may follow firms with better and timelier disclosure to gain an advantage in generating forecasts for other firms in the same industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample construction and research design. Section 4 presents the results, section 5 provides additional analysis and section 6 concludes.
Hypotheses

Forecast accuracy and MF-experience
Firms in the same industry share similar business environments, macroeconomic conditions, technologies, and growth opportunities. The information related to one firm is also often relevant to other firms in the same industry. Perhaps not surprisingly, prior studies have documented that information affecting the stock price of a firm often affects the price of other firms in the same industry (Foster, 1981 , Baginski, 1987 , Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson, 2008 . Ramnath (2002) indicates that analysts also revise their earnings forecasts based on industry peer firms' earnings announcement. Durnev and Mangen (2008) show that managers revise their beliefs about the value of projects and modify their own investment decisions based on accounting restatement announcements of their industry peer firms. This literature collectively shows that the information from other firms in the same industry plays a very important role when making resource allocation decisions in both external and internal capital markets. Intra-industry information transfer process will affect the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy.
Management forecasts contain very important information in financial market
(Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman, 2008) . For example, it has been shown that management forecasts affect stock prices (Pownall, Wasley and Waymire, 1993) ,
analysts' forecasts (Baginski and Hassell, 1990) , and bid-ask spreads (Coller and Yohn, 1997) analysts should better interpret the public information contained in management forecasts than non-MF analysts do. This motivates hypothesis H1a:
H1a: Analysts following a MF firm issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the non-MF firms in the same industry after a management forecast is issued by the MF firm than analysts not following the MF firm.
Clement, Koonce and Lopez (2007) define task-specific experience as "the analyst's experience in forecasting around a particular kind of situation or event".
In the setting of management forecast, interpreting the information released by MF firms could be regarded as a specific task. The task-specific experience is the experience of understanding and processing the information of MF firms. Analysts with more MF-experience, by definition, have more task-specific experience in this setting. They are more experienced in interpreting the information of the MF firms and more capable in translating the news to form forecasts for other firms. As suggested by Clement, Koonce and Lopez (2007) , more task-specific forecasting experience is associated with higher forecast accuracy when this specific task emerges.
This motivates hypothesis H1b:
H1b: Analysts with more MF-experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the non-MF firms in the same industry after a management forecast is issued by the MF firm than the analysts with less MF-experience.
Factors affecting the importance of MF-experience
MF-experience should offer advantages to analysts in forming earnings forecasts but the advantages may be conditional. When analysts with less MF-experience have no difficulty in interpreting the information contained in management forecasts, the benefits of following other firms in the same industry should be reduced. Precise information has less uncertainty and is easier to understand than imprecise information. If the information released by the MF firm is very precise, it may be easier for analysts with less MF-experience to interpret it accurately. In this case,
analysts with MF-experience may not perform better than analysts with less MF-experience. In contrast, if the information released by the MF firm is imprecise, then analysts with less MF-experience may have difficulty in interpreting the information and may be inaccurate when they forecast the earnings of non-MF firms in the same industry. In this case, the benefits of MF-experience will be increased.
This motivates hypothesis H2a:
H2a: Analysts' MF-experience offer greater advantage in improving the forecasting accuracy of the non-MF firms earnings when the information released by the MF firms is imprecise than when the information is precise.
Characteristics of the MF-firm may also affect the benefits of the MF-experience. 
Market reaction
In order to investigate whether financial analysts provide incremental information and whether the MF-experience helps in the intra-industry information transfer, it is important to examine how equity market reacts to the earnings revisions by MF and non-MF analysts. Prior literature suggests investors are more responsive to more accurate (Clement and Tse, 2003) or timelier forecast revisions (Cooper, Day and Lewis, 2001 All firms that share the same 4-digit SIC code with the MF firms at the time of management forecasts are treated as non-MF firms. To be included in the sample, the observations also need to satisfy the following requirements:
1) The analysts need to be active in forecasting the non-MF firms. Following Barron, Byard and Yu (2008) , I define active analysts as those who issue
forecasts of the non-MF firms in 45-day period before the management forecasts made by the MF firms and who also revise their forecasts in a 30-day period after the management forecasts made by the MF firms.
2) The non-MF firms have at least one active analyst with MF-experience and at least one active analyst without MF-experience.
3) The market prices of the non-MF firms are higher than five dollars at the time of management forecast.
The requirements allow us to make comparison only across active analysts.
I obtain management forecast and actual EPS from First Call database, analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S, financial data from COMPUSTAT, and firms return data from CRSP. There are 54,446 firm-year-analyst observations in the main sample.
Research design
The main focus of this study is to examine the properties of the revised forecasts of the non-MF firms and market reaction to the revised forecasts. The basic timeline of this setting is shown in figure 1.
Insert figure 1 here
In order to test H1a, I use the following empirical model:
where the subscripts i, j, and t indicate analyst, firm, and year.
AFA is the analyst forecast accuracy, defined as the absolute difference between analyst i's forecast and actual EPS of the peer firm j after the management forecast of the MF firm, scaled by the peer firm j's price just prior to management forecast made by the MF firm.
MF_Analyst is a dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 if the analyst follows the MF firms; it takes the value of 0 otherwise.
H1a predicts that the analysts' earnings forecasts are more accurate if the analysts are MF analysts. Thus β in model (1) is expected to be significantly negative. I include following set of control variables in the empirical model:
(1) Firm-year fixed effect:
α i is firm dummy and α j is year dummy. α i and α j control for firm-year fixed effect. OLS model with firm-year fixed effect is econometrically the same as the mean adjusted model specification in Clement, Koonce and Lopez (2007) .
(2) Analyst characteristics:
Pre-accuracy is analyst pre-announcement forecast accuracy, defined as the absolute difference between analyst i's forecast before the management forecast and actual EPS of the non-MF firm j scaled by the non-MF firm j's price one day before management forecast. Prior studies indicate that past accuracy is highly correlated with current and future accuracy (Brown, 2001) . A positive relationship is expected between pre-accuracy and AFA. Clement (1999) finds that forecast accuracy increases with longer firm-specific experience and larger employer size and decreases with more firms or industries followed. I control for these four characteristics in model (1) No. of analysts following defined as the number of analysts issuing forecasts for the non-MF firm j before the management forecast, Size defined as the natural log of the non-MF firm j's total assets (data6) in year t-1, Profitability defined as the income before extraordinary items (data18) scaled by total assets of the non-MF firm j in year t-1 and MB defined as the market to book ratio ((data6+data199*data25-data60)/data6) of the peer firm j in year t-1 are included to control non-MF firms' information environment, profitability and growth opportunities.
In order to test H3, following empirical model is employed: Revision is analyst forecast revision, defined as analyst forecast minus forecasts consensus before management forecast announcements scaled by the non-MF firm j's price just prior to management forecast. H3 predicts that investors will be more responsive when the revision is made by the analyst with more MF-experience, which suggests β 2 to be significantly positive.
Pre-accuracy is included as control variable because investors will be more responsive to the revisions made by more accurate analysts (Clement and Tse, 2003 ).
Investors will regard timely revisions as more informative ones because later revisions may just repeat the information already contained in early revisions. 
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of table 1 presents the pool sample descriptive statistics. The mean (median) of absolute analyst forecast error is 0.9% (0.4%) of the share price and the mean (median) days for analysts to make forecast revision after management forecast are 10.5 (8) days. Analysts in my sample have a median firm specific experience of 3 years and general experience of 6 years. This is comparable to the statistics in Clement, Koonce and Lopez (2007) in which sample median of analysts' firm specific experience and general experience are 3 years and 5 years respectively. Also my main sample tends to include firms with high analyst coverage (17 analysts as sample median).
Insert table 1 here
Panel B of table 1 shows the univariate results. MF analysts are more accurate in forecasting both before and after management forecast announcement than non-MF analysts. MF-analysts are also hired by larger broker house, have longer firm specific and general experience, follow more firms and industries, and revise their forecasts faster than non-MF analysts. The control variable firm specific experience does not behave as predicted in prior literature. Potential reasons could be that only active analysts are included in the sample and the forecast revision happens in a rather short period (30 days on average). Other control variables are generally consistent with the findings in prior studies. The average VIF (variance inflation factor) of the empirical model is less than 3 and the maximum VIF is less than 5, confirming that multi-colinearity is not a serious issue in this setting.
Results of testing H2a and H2b
Insert Consistent with the prediction of H2a and H2b, MF-experience offers more advantage in forecasting earnings of non-MF firms when the management forecast is imprecise or the non-MF firms are opaque. The difference between sub-groups is both economically and statistically significant. In untabulated results, I find similar patterns for the variable of MF_Analyst (MF firm coverage).
Timeliness of forecast revisions
Forecasting accuracy is only one measure of the relevance of the forecasts.
Investors are more responsive to revisions by forecast timeliness leaders and timely forecasts are valued by the market (Cooper, Day and Lewis, 2001) I then examine the impact of institutional ownership on the difference in market reaction to the forecasts made by MF and non-MF analysts. Institutional investors are regarded as sophisticated investors (Hand, 1990, Collins, Gong and Hriber, 2003) . Table 5 mainly comes from the non-MF firms with more institutional investors. In summary, all empirical results are consistent with predictions and support all the hypotheses in section 2.
Additional analysis
Robustness check
Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999) argue that only analysts with high innate ability could survive at the job so that analysts' experience may capture the innate ability of analysts. Thus even though pre-accuracy is controlled in all empirical models, it is possible that the innate ability of the analysts rather than experience drives the results reported in section 4. Two additional tests are done to address this concern.
First, analyst fixed effects are included in model (1), (2) and (4) MF_Analyst and MF_EXP should also matter for AFA t-1 . However, when using AFA t-1 as dependent variable, the coefficients of MF_Analyst or MF_EXP are very close to zero and insignificant (t-values are both less than 0.5).
Biases in information transfer process
Ramnath (2002) and Thomas and Zhang (2008) provide contradictory evidence regarding the biases in the intra-industry information transfer process. Ramnath (2002) argues that investors and analysts under-react to the information contained in other firms' earnings announcements, while Thomas and Zhang (2008) suggest that investors over-react to the information contained in other firms' earnings announcements. It is worth investigating whether or not analysts fully incorporate the information contained in other firms' management forecasts and how analysts' experience affects the biases. Results in Table 7 suggest that analysts over-react to management forecast news from MF firms. Moreover, analysts with more MF-experience do not provide less biased forecasts though their forecasts are more accurate. On the contrary, they tend to over-react more though the difference is not statistically significant. It is possible that they over-emphasize on the experience advantage they have. AFA is the absolute difference between analyst i's forecast and actual EPS after the management forecast scaled by the firm j's price just prior to management forecast. AFA is the absolute difference between analyst i's forecast and actual EPS after the management forecast scaled by the firm j's price just prior to management forecast. AFA is the absolute difference between analyst i's forecast and actual EPS after the management forecast scaled by the firm j's price just prior to management forecast. AFE is the signed difference between analyst i's forecast and actual EPS after the management forecast scaled by the firm j's price just prior to management forecast. 
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